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It is now nearly 25 years since the publication of Policy Styles in Western Europe, edited by 
Jeremy Richardson, which set out to compare European states by the “styles” that defined their 
approach to policy making. It was a systematic attempt to explore the ways in which the “standard 
operating procedures” in making decisions about policy could shape their content. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that a similar amount of time has elapsed since authors began to speak of a continuum 
of weak and strong states that reflected their capacity to shape policy outputs. Much has since 
happened with respect not only to policy content but also to how it has come to be understood; 
perhaps even more has happened to the capacity of modern states. Paradoxically, institutional 
arguments, which the policy styles and state capacity approaches helped establish, have assumed a 
central position in policy and political studies, despite the widespread consensus that the capacity 
and centrality of states have been challenged, if not undermined, by the growing porosity of 
national borders. This is especially the case in Europe where national borders are the most porous, if 
not already outright dismantled. The leads us to question whether the notion of policy styles, and its 
attendant concepts, remain useful tools in understanding the dynamics of public policy in 
contemporary Europe. The paper argues that they are but uses the concepts in a different way. 
Rather than look at them as the factors that shape policy, we will ask whether the growing porosity 
of national borders, particularly acute in the case of the European Union, has a significant effect on 
policy styles and state capacity.  
The paper will argue that the Richardson et al. schema provides a useful way of assessing 
state capacity and classifying states along a weak-strong continuum. With this as our starting point, 
we will try to assess the extent to which dynamics of European integration may affect policy styles 
and consequently state capacity. Our argument, using the Italian case, is that Europeanization has 
helped consolidate the variable geometry of policy styles; that is, that we can identify different 
policy styles between policy sectors. Indeed, one of the consequences of European integration is 
that it may strengthen the state in some sectors while not having the same effect in others. Italy was 
characterised in the 1980s as having a weak state that was easily penetrated by societal and political 
interests. It will ask whether state institutions continue to be penetrated by societal and political 
interests; or whether European integration has re-defined state capacity so that it is now better able 
to define and pursue interests not only at the European level but also domestically. If the latter is the 
case, then perhaps we need to begin to think of new ways of defining policy styles. 
The paper will be divided into four parts. The first will briefly re-visit the discussion of 
policy styles and link it more directly to that of state capacity. The second will make the connection 
between the burgeoning work on Europeanization and how it may provide some claims to be 
explored with respect to policy styles. The final two sections will explore two policy areas – 
regional development and industrial policy – in Italy to point out the emerging variable geometry of 
policy styles. 
 
 
 
Policy Styles and Strengthening States 
 
It is no coincidence that the discussion of policy styles began at about the same time as there 
emerged a concern with “bringing the state back in” when assessing political and policy outcomes. 
Institutions mattered and in the case of policy styles, they mattered to the extent that they shaped the 
way in which the ability of societal actors to penetrate decision-making structures was central to the 
content of decision-making, as were the institutions that made policy. Richardson et al. were 
interested in exploring whether there was an emerging convergence of “standard operating 
procedures for making and implementing policies” (Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan 1982). 
More specifically, they catalogued states along two axes that captured the essential features of these 
standard operation procedures, or policy styles (see Figure 1). These were distinguished by the   3
extent to which policy was the result of a consensual decision-making style or whether it was 
imposed by state structures; and whether decision-making was reactive or proactive in approaching 
policy problems and issues.  
 
Figure 1  
 
Source: Richardson et al: 13. 
 
While the contributions to the Richardson et al. volume did not make specific references to 
the notions of strong and weak states, there were clearly important links between the arguments 
about policy styles and those that distinguished states by their capacity to impose decisions and 
avoid penetration by societal interests in the making of policy (Ikenberry 1986). For instance, one 
of the central pillars of the policy style typology – that is, the extent to which states can impose 
policy choices as opposed to the search for a broad consensus – is very similar to the argument 
made by Peter Katzenstein which essentially assessed state capacity on the basis of the 
centralization of decision-making within a few parts of the executive and therefore less likely to be 
subject to the interests of particular groups (Katzenstein 1978). State capacity, and thus state 
strength, has been associated with its ability to penetrate society (or, in turn, to avoid being 
penetrated) and to impose its political decisions (Mann 1984). The strong state/weak state literature 
provided a useful typology by which to understand policy decisions; however, its central emphasis 
on the relationship between state and society is better served if it is complemented by a 
consideration of the capacity of the state to define what it wants; or to use the policy style approach, 
whether it anticipates or reacts to policy challenges. 
Combining the two axes provides a simple and neat way of classifying state capacity, with 
the horizontal axis illustrating, from left to right, those states that could define what they want; and, 
vertically, placing those states along a spectrum that illustrates those states that could get what they 
want. At one end of the first spectrum, we find states that take a rational approach to policy-making, 
with centralized decision-making structures and which have clearly defined objectives. At the other 
end, more reactive approaches tend to be incremental, with conflicts over goals and with limited 
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options available to states (Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan 1982). If we defined strong states as 
those that had the capacity to “steer” society in directions they wanted (Chandler and Bakvis 1989) 
and which could control territory and people in such a way that it defined society’s preferences, 
then we would probably find them in the bottom left-hand quadrant of figure 1. States would get 
progressively weaker in the bottom right-hand and top left-hand quadrants as these describe states 
that are either: not very good at defining policy issues and responses but still have the capacity to 
impose a solution on societal interests (bottom right); or states that could somehow define and 
anticipate policy choices despite having to engage in an extensive dialogue with societal actors. The 
weakest states would be found in the top right-hand quadrant, those that are so penetrated by 
societal interests that all policy is the result of extensive negotiation and compromise; and, 
correspondingly, do not have the capacity to anticipate policy challenges.  
Italy has traditionally been put in this last quadrant as it has fragmented decision-making 
structures, with numerous access point for societal interests, thus favouring a consensual approach 
to policy-making (Posner 1978; Ranci 1987). Additionally, a weak and divided executive, mapped 
onto an institutional and constitutional architecture that placed a premium on representation rather 
than system effectiveness produced a policy-policy-making style that assured “surviving without 
governing”. It was characterised by incrementalism, little consensus on policy objectives and deep 
social divisions (Di Palma 1977) so that governments rarely anticipated policy challenges and even 
more rarely could define their preferences and the terms of the political and policy debate. 
The earlier discussion of policy styles and state capacity provided a rather static picture of 
state-society relations and of approaches to solving policy issues; that is, policy styles and state 
capacity were taken as givens and used to explain different policy outputs. In the subsequent period, 
there has been a veritable explosion in policy analysis literature, especially in the European Union. 
This has included a concern with how strong weak and strong states have fared with respect to 
transnational pressures (Ikpe 2007; Quaglia and Maes 2004). Less attention has been paid to asking 
how state capacity might be affected by exogenous pressures. There is an extensive literature that 
has asked whether states are in crisis, decline or enhanced by greater interdependence (Cerny 1997; 
Evans 1997; Garrett 2000; Weiss 2005). The debate, while fruitful, has tended to deal with all states 
in the same way. It might be more useful to begin to examine whether different kinds of states are 
affected in different ways; and whether their capacity differs across policy areas.  
As numerous authors have pointed out, it is perhaps too simplistic to talk about general state 
capacity and, therefore, policy styles, in a comprehensive fashion (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; 
Weiss 1998). Rather, we can identify different policy sectors – perhaps security policy – in which 
states may be better able to impose their preferences, alongside other areas, such as budgetary 
policies, in which society is less penetrable and which states have less capacity to anticipate policies 
and impose them. Atkinson and Coleman traced different policy styles and different forms of state 
capacity according to the type of policy network that was formed in different sectors. The same 
approach might be used to examine the ways in which a common set of external pressures – in this 
case, what might be described as Europeanization – might affect policy style and state capacity in 
different policy areas.  
 
Europeanization and policy styles 
 
The concept of Europeanization has become one of the most widely used in European 
studies since the 1990s. The reason for this success is that Europeanization is a way of 
conceptualizing relations between EU institutions and member states and, in particular, looking at 
how the presence of the former changes the functioning of the latter. Even if literature on 
Europeanization is extremely broad and differentiated, a minimal tentative definition of the concept 
can be the following: a process of construction of supranational institutions and public policies at 
the European level and their consequent diffusion on national political systems (Graziano 2004). If 
this is true, it is plausible that not only Europeanization does concern public policies per se, but   5
concerns also how decisions are taken, from the institutional point of view; and more generally, 
from the policy styles point of view. In other words, Europeanization can affect both the axes on 
which policy styles can be classified, the consensual vs. the impositional role of the state, and the 
reactive vs. proactive approach to policy problems. 
Even if definition of Europeanization very rarely takes into account the question of policy 
styles, a brief excursus shows that the dimension of “the standard operating procedures” in making 
decisions in public policies is never considered. For example, in the first definition of 
Europeanization, that proposed by Ladrech (1994), Europeanization is defined “an incremental 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic 
dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-
making” (emphasis added). 
In a widely-cited paper, Radaelli (2000a, 4) offers a more articulated definition, making 
specific reference to policy-making styles. He claims that Europeanization includes: “processes of 
(a) construction, (b) diffusion, (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (emphasis added). For this 
reason, Dyson e Goetz (2002, 2) wrote that the concept of Europeanization “is sometimes used 
narrowly to refer to implementation of EU legislation or more broadly to capture policy transfer and 
learning within the EU. It is sometimes used to identify the shift of national policy paradigms and 
instruments to the EU level. (Other)… times it is used in a narrower way to refer to its effects at the 
domestic level… or in a more expansive way to include effects on discourse and identities as well 
as structures and polities at the domestic level”. Finally, Risse et al. (2001, 3) point out the 
importance of the process of Europeanization in shaping participation and features of actors and 
networks of actors participating in policy-making. In fact, they define Europeanization as “the 
emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of 
political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize 
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative 
European rules”. 
Having said this, how does Europeanization affect the different dimensions of national 
policies and policy-making? Börzel and Risse (2003) point out the importance of the degree of 
fit/misfit between supranational and national policies. Where there is a misfit, an adaptational 
pressure takes place, whose force varies according to the presence of mediating factors. These are, 
firstly, the number of veto points and the existence of supporting formal institutions in the case of a 
redistribution of resources; and the presence of norm entrepreneurs and cooperative informal 
institutions in the case of norm internationalization. The EU has three instruments in order to create 
an adaptational dynamic: an explicit pressure in the case in which the European policy-making 
triggers domestic change “by prescribing concrete institutional requirements with which member 
states must comply”; a more implicit pressure, when “European legislation… affects domestic 
arrangements by altering the domestic rules of the game” (like the domestic opportunity structures); 
and, finally, a ‘weakest’ form of pressure, when European policy “affects domestic arrangements… 
by altering the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors” (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999). 
Finally, Radaelli (2000) identifies four different state reactions to EU-induced changes. The 
first reaction is inertia, that corresponds to a lack of change. Generally speaking, inertia takes place 
when the misfit is too high to generate a reform. The second reaction is absorption, which indicates 
change as adaptation, that is to say an accommodation of policy requirement without real 
modification of the logic of political behaviour and of the policy’s essential framework and 
structure. Even if these last dimensions are called into question, we witness the third reaction to the 
Europeanization pressure, transformation. Finally, Europeanization can also produce retrenchment. 
In this case, a national policy can become less European than before.   6
Research on public policies has quite often taken into account the problem of convergence 
or divergence of national policies under EU pressure. In particular, Liefferink and Jordan (2005) 
considered the impact of Europeanization on the content of national policy (e.g. the introduction of 
new and the adaptation of existing standards), on the policy structure (e.g. the institutions involved 
in policy-making), and on the underlying goals and principles of policies (e.g. the affirmation of 
new ideas or the reform of the old ones). This last dimension is particularly interesting for the topic 
we want to address, since “this is where the content and the (empirically much more elusive) style 
of policy meet” (Liefferink and Jordan 2005, 107). 
Empirical research has shown that it is hard to speak about convergence of national policies 
around a unique “European” model. Sociological institutionalist theory, which argues that 
organizations become more isomorphic with the environment in which they operate and seek to be 
successful by following norms that are widely recognized to be appropriate and legitimate, does not 
seem to be very useful in explaining different outcomes. The lack of empirical evidence about the 
convergence between national and European policies can be related to the fact that national 
responses to European policies are decided in the context of national decision-making procedures, 
traditions and structures. In other words, pre-existence of national policy styles influences or filters 
the outputs and outcomes of European policies at the national level. However, even if there is not a 
convergence around a unique policy model and style, this does not mean that the EU does not alter 
the national policy model and style. Literature has also paid less attention to the question of state 
capacity in specific policy sectors. Moreover, the Italian case shows that not only is EU influence  
present, but also that it can vary from policy to policy. 
 
 
Industrial Policy in Euroland Italy:  
From a weak to a less weak state? 
 
Economic governance in post-war Italy does not fall into the same trajectory that might 
describe other industrialised states; that is, from a consensus and implementation of Keynesianism 
to a gradual transition (or even a rupture with the past) of liberal market-oriented approaches. 
Rather, there has never been a true and clear commitment to either as Italy’s post-war 
macroeconomic policy regime has been a constant tug of war between classical liberals and 
proponent of statism, Italian style (Locke 1995). The absence of a clear policy direction was the 
result not only from the lack of a hegemonic idea on economic governance but also the output of a 
policy style that was shaped by a weak state. Fragile government coalitions, with few legislative 
instruments available to the executive, were easy prey for societal interests to sway the shape and 
implementation of macroeconomic governance.  
Porous policy-making mechanisms became most apparent by the early 1970s when 
economic growth began to give way to stagflation, severely inhibiting the neo-classical emphasis on 
a tight monetary policy; as well as undermining the statist claim that public ownership of select few 
vital industries could ensure economic growth. The 1970s saw the incremental increase in state 
holdings as governments took over failing firms, from foodstuffs to automobiles, in an attempt to 
appease trade unions and other stakeholders, which increasingly included political parties. Industrial 
policy, such as it was, consisted primarily of state intervention and ownership layered on top of a 
public sector that was increasingly beginning to affect public finances in a negative way (Bianchi 
2002). It seemed easier for the state to take over firms than for governments to tackle to social and 
political costs of closing down industries that were no longer competitive. The paradox was that a 
highly consensual and incremental industrial policy produced extensive state intervention; and the 
more the state intervened, the greater was the penetration of societal and political interests in 
economic governance.  
Government decision-making in industrial policy was also diffused throughout different 
ministries. There was a Ministry of Industry whose mandate included planning and coordination of   7
policy. But it had to contend with an extensive state machinery that focuses specifically on 
development in the South, which dealt with strategic questions of industrialization in the less 
developed part of the country. In addition, there was a Ministry of State Holdings that managed the 
broad portfolio of industrial assets in state hands; and these in turn were part of large holding 
companies that had a degree of managerial autonomy as well as being a central shareholder in state-
held firms (Coltorti 1993). The Treasury also played a role as it was the primary shareholder in 
many of the state-held companies. Finally, the firms themselves, in this form of state capitalism, 
also had managerial autonomy while responding to the strategic decisions of their shareholder(s); in 
this case, the Italian state.  
There were attempts, beginning in the 1980s, to change the policy style, at least with respect 
to how government approached industrial issues. The main development here was law 675 of 1977, 
which created the Inter-ministerial Committee for Industrial Coordination (CIPI). The aim was to 
coordinate industrial strategy and perhaps follow statist principles similar to those in France (Locke 
1995). The attempt to rationalise decision-making is interesting with respect to the two axes that 
assess policy styles and state capacity. On the one hand, it could be seen as an attempt to more from 
more passive to pro-active decision-making, with governments setting out industrial strategies 
before crises forced their hand. On the other hand, the CIPI also called for extensive participation 
by societal actors, including trade unions and employers’ associations. The attempt at further 
rationalization continued into the 1990s, when the functions of the CIPI were collapsed into the 
Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (Presidential Decree n.373, 20 April 1994). 
Industrial strategy would be part of a more comprehensive approach to macroeconomic policy. But 
here again, societal input was guaranteed through the 1993 agreements, which called for 
concertation between government and the social partners (trade unions and employers) for the 
practically all major macroeconomic policy-making.  
The 1980s also saw the first attempts to introduce more market-oriented criteria in making 
choices in industrial policy, including the first attempts at privatization. What is important for our 
discussion is that relying on markets was seen not only as an economic decision, but also one that 
would bypass the problems of having extensive intervention by a weak state that had little capacity 
to plan and was easily penetrated. However, it was this same state that had to make the strategic 
choices about what strategies to pursue, what to privatise, who to sell to and so on. The case of the 
privatization of Alfa Romeo in the early 1980s was indicative of this dilemma (Cassese, Bianchi, 
and Della Sala 1988). The takeover bid by American auto producer Ford was rejected in favour of 
that by FIAT, seemingly to keep a traditional national firm in Italian hands as well as support 
FIAT’s industrial strategy to expand into the more high end market. Arguably, so long as policy-
making was caught in the irony of extensive intervention by a weak state, even bold attempts at 
economic liberalization (which the measures of the 1980s were not) would be subject to political 
and social pressures. 
Breaking out of this vicious circle would require either a cataclysmic change in the political 
landscape or an exogenous shock to the system. In the case of industrial policy, the major 
transformations in the party system and the parties themselves in the 1990s had only a limited 
effect. There was no emergent political force that had a clear strategy to meet the challenges of an 
increasingly global marketplace and, more importantly, of making Italian firms competitive once 
the devaluation instrument would be dismantled with the start of the Euro. The new parties were 
often just a remixing of the old; more importantly, none of them seemed intent on presenting a clear 
industrial strategy that could respond to new challenges and possibly take on vested interests such 
as trade unions, local authorities and even Italian financial institutions. Pressure for rationalization 
in policy-making came from below in the form of a abrogative referendum in which 94% of voters 
(with a participation rate of almost 75%) voting to abolish the Ministry for State Holdings. 
The referendum to abolish the Ministry was just one part of broader process in which 
decision-making in industrial policy has been restructured in the last two decades. Under pressure 
from the EU and, partly as a result of the 1994 referendum, the large state holding institutions such   8
as the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), were dismantled by the end of the 1990s. Seen as 
the architect for Italy’s industrial miracle in the immediate post- war period, it had become, by the 
1980s, a drain on public resources as it was the repository of failing firms that fell into state hands. 
Its dissolution was supposed to be emblematic of the end of state intervention and state-led 
development, and the disembedding of industrial policy from political considerations and 
calculations. Alongside the shutting the down of the primary institution for regional development, 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the end of state holdings seemed to be a step in the direction of 
consolidating – at least at the ministerial level – decision-making. 
The process continued with the election of the centre-right Berlusconi government in 2001. 
The Ministry of Industry was restructured into the Ministry for Productive Activity; this in turn was 
changed again in 2006 with the new centre-left government of Romano Prodi. It became the 
Ministry for Economic Development, absorbing the important Department for Cohesion and 
Development Policy that had been part of the Ministry of the Economy. There have been successive 
attempts, then to create some degree of centralization within the executive to coordinate industrial 
policy, including those dealing with regional development. However, even the new Economic 
Development ministry must contend with a degree of fragmentation. For instance, the Economic 
Ministry continues to be an important share-holder (in some cases with only a golden share) in 
some key assets. Moreover, in some highly politicised cases, such as the highway operator 
Autostrade, Alitalia and Telecom Italia, a range of ministers took centre stage. For instance, in the 
case of the proposed sale of Autostrade, privatised in 1999, to a Spanish firm agreed to by the 
Berlusconi government in April 2006, it was the Public Works minister in the Prodi government 
who took a central role in ensuring that the deal would collapse. The Prodi government, especially 
the Minister for Economic Development, claimed that it wanted to increase foreign direct 
investment into Italy; yet, there were constant interventions by the government as a whole, or parts 
of it, to scuttle deals that would lead to major firms falling into foreign hands. Despite attempts to 
place the coordination of industrial policy in the hands of a ministry with a broad mandate of 
economic development, decision-making remains fragmented and must contend with little 
consensus on objectives and means. 
One of the potential sources of change to policy styles and state capacity was privatization. 
Transferring the ownership of firms was not simply a question of shifting the public-private 
balance, but also one of disembedding politics from strategic industrial choices. It needs to be 
pointed out that the debate centred entirely on the ownership of firms and not on their control; a 
change to the latter was not necessarily guaranteed by that to the former. Italy’s privatization record 
in the 1990s and the current decade is amongst the most impressive in the EU, with receipts from 
firms sold back to the public going a long way towards improving public finances in the mid-1990s. 
This leads to the question of whether privatization was a sign, as well as a cause, of a policy-making 
style which reflected a determined government strategy that was imposed on societal actors. Are 
there signs that industrial policy in Italy is now the product of, if not a strong state, at least one that 
is less weak than it was twenty-five years ago? It is useful to look at the case of 
telecommunications, and more specifically Telecom Italia, to see whether the answer to the query is 
an affirmative one. 
Italy’s largest telecommunications provider was privatised by the centre-left government of 
in 1997, in what was trumpeted as one of the largest transfers from the public to the private sphere. 
Bringing close to $12 billion (US) to the state coffers, it was part of a broader restructuring in the 
sector in preparation for the liberalization as a result of decisions taken at the European Union level. 
The government was able to secure that the company remained controlled by Italian concerns, 
creating a none-member syndicate that promised no major changes for a two year period. Despite 
this promise, the company was quickly immersed in controversy as its first chairperson, Guido 
Rossi, who had close ties to the government, resigned only a month after privatization. His 
successor, Gian Mario Rossignolo, fared little better as he antagonised trade unions with a leaked 
plan to seek out labour concessions. The company fell to Franco Bernabè, who began to seek an   9
alliance with Deutsche Telekom in 1999. However, the idea that the leading Italian firm in an 
industry central to the new economy would fall into foreign hands (and one still under German state 
control) was politically sensitive and unacceptable in many government circles. The result was that 
a rival bid made by a group of Italian investors one-fifth of the size of Telecom Italia was 
engineered partly by the government of Massimo D’Alema. Telecom Italia went from being a 
healthy company with little debt to one that was now heavily indebted as a result of its takeover bid; 
but the political objective of making sure it remained in Italian hands was achieved. 
We can race ahead in our story to 2006, with the company now controlled by industrial giant 
Pirelli but still carrying a heavy debt load that was the result not of an investment strategy but of 
decisions to sell parts of the company to Italian investors who had little capital of their own. In 
September 2006, there are reports in the press that Pirelli wanted to spin off and sell TI’s mobile 
and fixed line assets, and to concentrate on broadband technology. The logic of the industrial 
strategy is not important here (it represented a dramatic reversal of an earlier decision, leading 
investors and analysts to wonder whether there was any long-term strategy); what is interesting is 
the political reaction to the announcement. The immediate concern was that the assets would be 
bought by foreign investors, once again raising the spectre of a leading Italian firm falling into 
foreign hands. A document drafted by the chief economic advisor to the Prime Minister, Romano 
Prodi, was leaked to the press. It contained a series of responses that the government might provide 
to the TI strategy, including re-nationalization of at least the fixed network. Prodi denied that the 
document was part of the government’s thinking on what to do with respect to the Pirelli decision. 
In the end Pirelli abandoned its plans but stirred further controversy in April 2007, when it 
announced that it was considering a bid from American company AT&T and one of its Mexican 
partners. Once again, political alarm bells sounded and the American firm removed its bid, citing 
worries about political interference. A new buyer was found in an investors syndicate of Italian 
banks and a Spanish telecommunications company that would guarantee the  
What is important in this story is trying to assess the extent to which governments were able 
to clearly define what were the state’s policy interests in the sector, how governments made and 
implemented decisions and whether these were imposed by the state or the result of the penetration 
of societal interests. As Mark Thatcher has argued, “predatory political parties” were responsible 
for blocking attempts until the 1990s to reform the telecommunications sector in Italy; but that 
change occurred rapidly in the mid-1990s (Thatcher 2004). Privatization was only one part of a 
change in policy that included liberalization of markets and services as well as an important role for 
independent regulatory agencies. This was partly presented as a shift dictated by new European 
rules, so there was some degree of blame shifting when met with domestic resistance. The fact that 
any decisions on ownership and control of the company would be subject to not only competition 
authorities but also security regulators and the independent authority that monitors the 
telecommunications industry. One consequence is that it has made it easier for governments to 
insulate themselves from societal pressures by arguing that any solution would have to abide by 
European rules. In other words, there were now fewer veto points for actors to access and a greater 
capacity for governments to impose solutions. In this sense, we can say that in this case, Italy has 
moved up along the Richardson et al. vertical axis. 
 
Figure 2   10
 
 
 
 
The case of Telecom Italia suggests that, in the case of industrial policy, it is less apparent 
that there has been a move on the horizontal spectrum in the direction of more rational, focused 
decision-making; in other words, governments do not exhibit a greater capacity to define what they 
want. Here, despite the attempts to rationalise decision-making, there is only marginally more 
clarity in defining what are the state’s strategic interests. For instance, the centre-left governments 
from 1996-2001 staked industrial policy around privatization and using the receipts from the sale of 
government assets to help public finances meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. However, once 
the objective of entry into Euro was met, the singularity of purpose was lost. The centre-right 
governments of 2001-2006 saw industrial strategy through large public works projects such as high 
speed railroads and a bridge across the Strait of Messina to connect Sicily to the Continent. It faced 
stiff resistance from environmental groups and local interests affected by some of these large 
projects.  
The centre-left government that came to power in 2006 has placed competitiveness and 
liberalization at the centre of its economic strategy. Yet its early record on industry has been, at 
best, mixed. It has responded to pressure to prevent domestic firms from falling into foreign hands. 
Taking its lead from the French, with its renewed attempt to have state led industrial development 
with the Beffa Report, the Economic Development ministry is to target key sectors that it would 
like to see developed. So while there is a great deal of rhetoric about how having markets decide 
which industries to develop and who is to own them, the Prodi government has not hesitated to 
continue to intervene in response to pressures within its own coalition and from within trade union 
and financial sectors.  
Governments have been able to impose decisions in industrial policy that they have been 
able to present as a European commitment to which there was no alternative, such as the 
dismantling of IRI, liberalization in some key sectors and even privatization. But Europe has 
provided less clarity on key questions about who is to control industrial firms and how so that not 
very much has changed with respect to how firms are run in Italy. A few major industrial and 
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financial groups, all with close ties to political power, continue to control major industrial firms. 
The external pressures on industrial policy have not provided the clear reference points that has 
been the case in monetary or even fiscal policy. The space that has been left to governments has 
only highlighted the incapacity of the state to define what it wants in the sector. 
 
Cohesion Policy in Italy:  
From a weak to a stronger state? 
 
As in the case of industrial policy, regional development policy in Italy has, for a long 
period of time, elements that characterise a public policy typical of a weak state. It was shaped by 
the persistence of socio-economic divergence between large areas of the country, in particular that 
between the regions of the North, the home of the richest and most industrialised parts of the 
country, and the South, largely rural and agricultural. Consequently, regional development policy 
became synonymous with the Extraordinary Intervention for the South, created in the wake of war 
in 1950 and based on the Tennessee Valley Authority, which had managed water and energy 
resources and agricultural and industrial development in the Tennessee Valley in the 1930s (La 
Spina 2003, 200). 
The Intervention for the South was extraordinary on two fronts. The first was quantitative in 
that funds were in addition to those allocated for depressed regions; the second was qualitative in 
that the funds were managed by procedures different from those generally used and by specific 
institutions such as the Fund for the South. (Annesi 1996; La Spina 2003). Although not without its 
success stories, the Intervention became, by the 1980s, characterised by policy-making described 
typically as consensual if not clientelistic. Beyond its natural role in helping depressed areas, it 
became an essential instrument used by political parties to mobilise electoral support. As a result, 
the parties exercised a great deal of control over the Intervention; this within the context of a 
national government incapable of turning off the financial taps that were running in the absence of 
clear planning that established identifiable priorities. Institutionally, there were a number of 
ministries that were responsible for the policy. Alongside the Ministry for the South, important 
roles were assumed by the Ministry for the Budget, the Treasury, as well as for Agriculture and 
Transport as many forms of intervention were aimed at improving infrastructure. Given this 
growing fragmentation of decision-making and the role of political interests, the Intervention was 
destined to conflict with the nascent Community cohesion policy.  
Graziano (2003) illustrates how the Intervention’s objectives, principles, instruments and 
procedures differed significantly from those of cohesion policy. While European intervention, after 
reforms in 1988, were clearly defined as were the areas destined for help, Extraordinary 
Intervention aimed generally at “economic and social progress for southern Italy” (Art. 1, Law 10 
August 1950). The law did not provide any further guidance on the type of planning measures nor 
on the areas that required more helps than others; and it did not provide any indication of what 
criteria would be used to assess success. The differing organizing principles also presented a 
possible conflict. For instance, with Extraordinary Intervention, there was no provision for 
additionality according to which beneficiaries (the regions and the local governments, in particular) 
would co-finance projects; nor was there any reference to planning, which would program 
intervention over an extended period to limit fragmentation and ensure cohesion. Finally, the 
Extraordinary Intervention left no room for partnerships, both vertical and horizontal, that allowed 
for the widespread participation of all interested actors; now for concentration, which would ensure 
that certain issues and problems would be given direct attention. By the end of the 1980s, it was 
clear that there was a high degree of misfit between the Intervention and European cohesion policy.  
Bull e Baudner (2004) divide into three periods the process of change that was begun with 
the abolition of the Intervention with Law 488/1992. The first is between 1988 and 1992, and 
coincides with the abolition of the Intervention, which had become “politically and morally 
inconvenient” (Cafiero 1994). The abolition can be traced to both economic and political factors.   12
The former were linked primarily to the lack of positive results, especially given the amount of 
economic resources that had been invested in the South. The latter referred primarily to the 
emergence of new political movements, such as the Northern League, whose political rhetoric 
signalled the end of a consensus on extraordinary intervention for the South. Moreover, the decline 
of the traditional parties (especially the Christian Democrats, who came to symbolise the southern 
clientelism for a host of reasons), the abolition through referenda of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
that for State Holdings and the start of criminal proceedings for corruption contributed to making it 
difficult to continue to justify the Extraordinary Intervention.  
Europeanization’s effect began to take hold even if just in the form of a constraint; the 
national and regional authorities have more than a little difficulty drafting the Community Support 
Framework (CSF), betraying Italian inefficiency (especially in the South). Once the CSFs were 
approved, the southern regions struggled to spend the structural funds. This was because the 
cohesion policy changed the logic of funding regional development spending. Whereas the 
Extraordinary Intervention was based on “funds in search of a project”, the cohesion policy was 
based on the reverse form of “projects in search of funds”. It should come as no surprise that. “the 
Community “challenge” was not met with the required commitment, as previous habits died hard 
and actors were used to a system that was much more generous in its funding and much more lax in 
the rules to manage it” (La Spina 2003, 266). Beyond the direct Europeanization effect on the 
Extraordinary Intervention, an indirect effect on regional development policy came through the 
Maastricht treaty, which required a major transformation in the management of public finances and 
the beginning of economic recovery (Fabbrini e Brunazzo 2003). 
Essentially, the Europeanization effect was limited between 1988 and 1992. The southern 
regions did not perceive the paradigmatic change that had taken place (in some cases, they even try 
to hamper it) and even if the national government was aware of the challenge ahead, it remained 
wary of involving the regions in decision-making processes. This was, then, a period of negative 
integration, with Europeanization leading to the crisis of a policy paradigm without replacing them 
(Bull e Baudner 2004). 
The second period encompassed the period from 1992 to 1996 and was characterised by an 
attempt to reform regional development policy with the creation (albeit in a disorganised and 
inorganic way) of new policy instruments. These put an emphasis, for the first time, on negotiations 
between the regions and the central government; and were at the origins of “negotiated planning”, 
which referred to “agreed upon regulation between relevant public and private sector actors for the 
implementation of various forms of intervention, with a specific developmental aim, and which 
require an overall assessment of the activity carried out (Law n.104, 7 April 1995). The result was 
that in the 1995-6 period, a number of decision-making instruments were created that included: 
programmatic accords, programmatic contracts, programmatic agreements, territorial pacts and area 
contracts. 
The lack of an organic reform plan went hand-in-hand with the lack of national coordination 
in regional policy. The task was carried out only partially by the Treasury ministry and the Inter-
ministerial Committee on Economic Planning. It also highlighted the failure of the “control room” 
experiment, which was the result of an agreement between the Minister for the Budget, Rainer 
Masera and the European Commissioner for Regional Policy at the time, Moniker Wulf-Mathies. It 
was meant to have been an instrument for coordination of and support to initiatives that come from 
the Community level (Carzaniga 1998). Again in this period, Italy has problems in spending funds 
allocated to it, despite the fact that CSFs had clearly improved in their capacity to spend towards the 
end of the 1994-99 period (La Spina 2003, 268-271).  
Between 1992 and 1996, Europeanization is carried out primarily through, on the one hand, 
competition policy and the privatization and dissolution of IRI, which played an instrumental role in 
providing loans for development in the South; and, on the other hand, the abolition of tax 
deductions for the South that was requested by the Commission. In this period as well, then,   13
Europeanization comes through a process of negative integration; that is, through the dismantling of 
national provisions in the context of an emerging regional development policy. 
The third period, from 1996 to 2000, is one of reformulation of policy for the South that 
took place within an environment of political stability. Even in the aftermath of the crisis of the 
Prodi government in 1998, successive centre-left governments did not alter by very much the 
guidelines to policy for the South. The first novel item of substance was the creation of the 
Department for Development Policies (DPS) in 1998. It was designed as a support structure that 
aimed to improve the planning capacity of the regions with respect to regional development and 
Community cohesion policies (Barca 1998).The DPS acted as a coalition-builder between various 
national and sub-national actors, as well as the coordinator for any measures aimed at the South (La 
Spina 2003, 285; Graziano 2003, 106-107). Thanks to the reforming thrust of the DPS, national 
development policy instruments were co-ordinated with those of European regional development 
policy; and the capacity to attract and spend funds was strengthened through the introduction of 
specific performance awards, with selection criteria that were even more stringent than those of the 
Community. 
This broad reform of national development policy occurs contemporaneously with two other 
factors. The first refers to the decreasing role of previous veto players, particularly political parties, 
which, as mentioned previously, sought to discretional spending in the allocation of the 
Extraordinary Intervention funds (Graziano 2003). The second factor was the emergence of a 
coalition favourable to Europeanization; indeed, a coalition that exploits the pressure coming from 
Europe to carry out an institutional project. As Vassallo argues, “The existence of Community 
pressures would not, on its own, produce this rationalization. For this to occur, it was crucial that 
there was a solid political leadership in the Ministry of the Treasury, that of Ciampi, supported by 
an equally authoritative administrative leadership, that of the director of the Treasury [ndr, Mario 
Draghi]” Vassallo (2000, 313). Fabrizio Barca, the DPS head, claims that, “The system of 
Community structural funds, because of the opportunity for integration amongst the forms of 
intervention inherent to it, because of the relative flexibility of its objectives and because of the 
international logic of the rules it allows to be introduced, lends itself to be used to carry out a 
transformation of regional development policy. Moreover, the planning of public investments with 
Community funds allows for the design for a systems of rules that has two features: decisions may 
be made by a partnership involving four levels of government – supranational, national, regional, 
local – without generally needing new laws; once the rules have been established, their re-
negotiation is exceedingly costly as it involves the international level. For these reasons, the 
opportunity was not lost (2000, 42)”.  
The reformed policy was called “new planning” to indicate the eclipse of the strategic void 
of the first half of the 1990s; and, at the same time, a new approach to the problems of retarded 
development that was based on giving a central place to the mobilization of knowledge of all 
relevant actors, on close attention to evaluation and assessment at each stage of decision-making, on 
the decentralization of decision-making and on multi-year intervention plans (Ministero del Tesoro 
1998). In this third period, Europeanization produces positive integration in that makes a significant 
contribution to the formulation of a new policy paradigm. European pressure acted as a constraint, 
pushing for change, but also as an opportunity for reform, especially for those actors prepared to 
exploit its benefits. However, without favourable domestic conditions, Europeanization would have 
accomplished little on its own. Bull e Baudner argue, Europeanization acts as a catalyst at the 
domestic level which reinforces, more that causes, internal change (2004, 1072-1073). ì 
The policy learning and reform process begun at the national level also has an impact on 
Italy’s capacity to act in Brussels. On the one hand, favoured the identification of a national interest 
much more readily than in the past. On the other hand, it helped contribute to and widen Italian 
participation in the reform of cohesion policy (Brunazzo 2007). 
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Conclusion 
 
Even after 25 years, the book edited by Jeremy Richardson seems to be very useful. The two 
axes defining different policy styles can be interesting instruments in the definition of a space in 
which different “standard operating procedures” can be placed and conceptualised. However, our 
paper has reached two partially different conclusions. The first is that it is now difficult to speak 
about a single national policy style. As the Italian case shows, there is no doubt that, generally 
speaking, for a long time Italy was considered a weak state captured by societal interests with a 
consensual policy making and with a reactive (rather than anticipatory) problem-solving. But a 
more accurate analysis showed that policy styles differ across policy sectors. Since the beginning of 
the 1990s, Italian policy style in regional policy is more similar to that of a strong state rather than 
to a weak state, as the case of industrial policy shows. 
The second conclusion is that policy styles vary across time. The economic crises of 1992 
and the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht have created a pressure for relevant reforms in Italy 
which have contributed to the definition of new policy styles. The case of regional policy clearly 
shows this trend, but one can reach this conclusion also looking at the case of industrial policy, 
where changes, although limited, did take place. Europeanization is one of the factors that can 
influence national policy styles. It can change redistribution of political and economic resources by 
lowering veto points, fostering change through formal institutions, creating cooperative informal 
institutions or empowering norms entrepreneurs. Certainly, even pressure of Europeanization is far 
from producing isomorphism between countries (creating similar policies and policy styles) or 
across policy sectors inside the same country. This two conclusions lead us to speak about a 
variable geometry of policy styles rather than of single national policy styles. 
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